Two months of ceasefire with Iran: when negotiation is part of the conflict

Experts predict a “protracted dynamic” amidst “measured blows” and “calculated impacts”

The ceasefire agreed upon by the United States and Iran—intended to allow space for negotiations to end the war launched by the US military alongside Israel—has reached the two-month mark. This comes amidst a conflict reignited by recent exchanges of attacks between Washington and Tehran, while negotiations proceed slowly and have themselves become another element of the conflict.

After Iran responded to the war by attacking Gulf nations hosting US bases and blocking the Strait of Hormuz—triggering a crisis of global proportions—the conflict entered a new phase on April 7 with a 15-day truce. This was followed by several extensions based on various pretexts, yet all aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement.

Against this backdrop, the strategy of a flexible truce with no apparent expiration date has left the crisis involving Iran in a strange “impasse.” The US leader reiterates threats and warnings while simultaneously extending an olive branch to Iranian negotiators, seeking a deal to unblock the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for easing international sanctions.

This pattern of Washington’s constant push-and-pull, combined with recent attacks and counter-attacks, leads JosĂ© MarĂ­a Peredo—a professor of Communication and International Politics at the European University—to note that these actions serve as pressure tactics for a negotiation process that has itself become part of the conflict. “Negotiations are effectively open at any given moment, yet they are also backed by targeted attacks within the regional context,” he maintains.

“We have entered a more protracted dynamic, where not only war and attacks are part of the conflict, but the negotiation process itself is also part of it,” he states, acknowledging that it is currently unclear whether the talks are progressing or remaining stalled. “It remains unclear whether the alliance between Israel and the United States remains solid or has unraveled due to actions taken by Netanyahu. Nor is it known whether Trump’s off-the-cuff remarks are decisive factors or merely serve as a pressure tactic,” summarizes Peredo, attributing the situation to the immense complexity of modern international relations.

This is despite signs of rapprochement from the parties involved, including various proposals to halt hostilities and begin reopening the Strait of Hormuz. In late May, for instance, the United States spoke of an agreement in principle with Iran to extend the truce for another two months and guarantee passage through the Strait.

Under this proposal, the 60-day ceasefire would be accompanied by unrestricted passage through Hormuz—meaning no tolls or harassment of merchant vessels. A second phase would see the opening of nuclear negotiations with Washington, focusing on the elimination of highly enriched uranium and a commitment from the Islamic Republic not to develop nuclear weapons—a point that, according to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Tehran has already accepted as a starting point.

In contrast, Iran circulated a different initiative containing elements more favorable to its own position, such as a provision that the management and routing of vessels through Hormuz would be handled by Iranian authorities in cooperation with Oman—effectively granting Tehran control over the strategic waterway.

The Iranian draft also indicated that the United States had committed to withdrawing its military forces from Iran’s periphery, although the scope of this measure remains to be negotiated.

In any case, the talks extend beyond the United States, Iran, and the mediator, Pakistan; they are of global significance. Israel, the Gulf states, and China are all working behind the scenes to address a conflict that has plunged the Middle East into instability and carries economic consequences—particularly for the energy market—that reach far beyond the region itself. In any case, Peredo considers it likely that the negotiation process will continue, as there has been no uncontrolled military escalation; the strikes have been measured throughout, and contacts have been maintained. He explains that while the United States’ primary objective is to ensure the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and restart negotiations on the nuclear program, Iran is striving to preserve the regime and avoid having the negotiations perceived as a surrender. Meanwhile, Israel—a key player in the conflict—is pursuing its own interests and would need to conclude its campaign to weaken Iran and its regional allies.

The backdrop to the negotiations is, in any case, the US political landscape, with the November deadline and the midterm elections acting as factors pushing Trump to seal a deal. The US side “is in a rush to reach some sort of agreement,” explains a professor from the European University, while also noting a certain element of improvisation in Trump’s approach to the conflict with Iran.

“It is not part of a grand strategy,” he observes regarding Washington’s moves since launching a large-scale offensive against Iran—capitalizing on a moment of weakness. “The situation has become complicated because no sufficiently acceptable solution has been found,” he notes, suggesting that Washington had hoped regime change in Iran would go hand-in-hand with a shift in policies regarding issues such as the nuclear program.

NUCLEAR TALKS
Ultimately, regardless of when hostilities cease and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz ends, the next step in the complex US-Iran relationship appears to be a diplomatic process aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program.

In this regard, the parties have exchanged messages concerning the future of the nuclear material currently held at Iran’s nuclear facilities—a key priority for Trump, who views its removal as proof that Tehran is not pursuing the development of nuclear weapons.

In Peredo’s view, the military crisis could actually lead to a “breakthrough” on the nuclear issue. “Iran has very little to gain and a great deal to lose by maintaining its current confrontational stance,” he explains, insisting that reaching an agreement on the nuclear issue “would not be a surrender, but a change of course.”

He also highlights that, in the past, Iranian leaders—acting from a position of moderation—have moved closer to the possibility of a nuclear limitation agreement, such as the one negotiated with the US in 2015 under Barack Obama, which Donald Trump tore up during his first term in the White House.

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